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Ln the Suprente Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROYAL AUDREY BACKUS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GUS S. HOOTEN and ELLA H. 
HOOTEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8375 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff from a judg-
ment dated :March 30th, 1955, and filed and entered 
April 4th, 1955, dismissing the plaintiff's corn plaint on 
the ground that said complaint does not state a claim 
on which relief can be granted, Hon. Will L. Hoyt, 
Judge. (Rec. 10). 
For the purpose of this appeal all of the facts pleaded 
in plaintiff's complaint, excepting the allegations of Par-
agraph XI thereof, mm;t be taken as true. Paragraph 
XI alleges a legal conclusion presenting a point of law 
which is the crux of this appeal. 
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2 
The material allegations of the complaint are short, 
and for the convenience of the Court we deem it advi~­
able to set them forth verbatim. 
Comes now the plaintiff above named, and for cause 
of action against the defendants and each of them, 
alleges: 
1. 'rhat the said defendants are now and have 
been during all of the times herein stated, husband 
and wife, and residents within Beaver County, State 
of Utah; 
2. That on or about the 1st day of November, 
1952, and prior thereto, one Jerry Busby was in 
the business of levelling land and making improve-
ments on lands so that the same would be suscept-
iqle of irrigation aml proper cultivation; that on 
or about the 1st day of November, 1952, the de-
fendants herein entered into a contract with the 
said J err:v Busby h~T which said Busby was to level 
a number of acres of land for them on their prem-
ises situated in Beaver County, Utah, and more par-
ticularly described as the north one-half of the 
northeast one-quarter of Section 36, Township 2b 
South of Range 11 \Vest, S. L. J\L, for a sum far in 
excess of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), the exact 
amount of ·which this plaintiff does not know; 
3. That the defendai1ts herein did not obtain 
from the said contractor, J err:T Busby, the boncl 
for the benefit of themselves, as the owners of 
said land, and for the benefit of those who would 
furnish materials and labor in the performance of 
said contract as contemplated h~T and required by 
Chapter 2, Tit]e 14, Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, R. R. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
u. 1953; 
-1-. That the said contractor, Jerry Bushy, was 
insolvent, and depended for necessary labor and 
materials and machinery and equipment to com-
plete his said contract, upon such credit as he might 
obtain from laborers, materialmen, and those able 
to furnish him with the necessary machinery and 
equipment and upon their reliance of a right to the 
statutory bond aforesaid conditioned for the pay-
ment of their accounts. 
5. That this plaintiff extended credit to the 
said Jerry Busby, and delivered to him certain nla-
chinery and equipment to be used and which were 
used in levelling· of defendants' said lands and thus 
making improYements thereon. believing that the 
said defendants herein had either procured a bond, 
as provided hy the act aforesaid, or that they would 
themselves be responsible for the reasonable rental 
value of the said machinery and equipment thus 
used for the benefit of their premises. 
6. That this plaintiff delivered the said machin-
ery and equipment to the said contractor Busby on 
or about November 1st, 1952, and that plaintiff is 
informed and believes and therefore alleges that 
the said Busby used machinery and equipment in 
the levelling of said lands commencing- with the said 
<late, and ~ontinually thcn·afh•r until Deremher 
L5th, 1952. 
7. That the said Contractor Bushy agTP<'d to 
pay for the rental of the said machinery a1Hl equip-
ment the sum of $850.00, and which sum was the 
rem;onable rental YahH· thereof for the period it 
was so m~ecl; that no part of the sai<l sum has hcPn 
paid by the said Busby, or anymw in his hrhalf, or 
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4 
by the defendants herein, excepting the sum of 
$408.00, thus leaving a balance of $44:2.00 remaining 
unpaid, all of which said sum is now due and pay-
able. 
8. That plaintiff is informed and believes and 
therefore alleges that the eontract price for level-
ling said lands, stipulated for between the defend-
ants and said contractor, if devoted entirely to the 
payment of labor and materials and the rental of 
said machinery, would have paid said accounts in 
full; that during the progress of said work, the de-
fendants paid or caused to be paid to the contractor 
some of the contract price, but took no precautions 
to have the said contractor pay this plaintiff's ac-
count in full, or in the eYent the said defendants did 
not pay the said contractor any part of said con-
tract price, then they haYe received the benefit of 
the work so done by the contractor as aforesaid 
without paying anything therefor; 
9. That after commencing the said contract as 
aforesaid the said contractor defaulted in the full 
performance of his contract, leaving the contract 
only partially performed and some of the work 
uncompleted, and that the said defendants were 
compelled to and did thereafter compl0te the said 
work, or cause the same to be done. 
J 0. That by reason of the said defendant's fail-
ing to procure a bond from said Bus by, as prO\'ided 
by the statute, the~' were unable to compel the ~aid 
Busby, or his sureties, to complete the contract; 
and by reason of the foregoing ronditions this 
plaintiff has no means of collecting her account as 
aforesaid, except from the saicl defendant~. 
11. That under the said statute a~ nfm·psaid~ nnd 
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by reason of the foregoing conditions and facts, the 
said defendants are personally liable to this plain-
tiff for the balance due her as the reasonable rental 
value of the said machinery and equipment ar:; 
aforesaid. (Rec. 3-6). 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint upon the gTound that it failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. (Rec. 7). 
Thereafter the motion was argued and submitted to 
the Court, who filed a memorandum of decision thereon 
and held that the complaint did not state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted and ordered the complaint 
dismissed. ( Rec. 9) . 
Accordingly, the Court then made its written order 
!;Ustaining the motion and dismissing the complaint, and 
''ordered, adjudged and decreed that * * * the com-
plaint be and the same is hereby dismissed." (Rec. 10). 
From the above order and judgment this appeal is 
prosecuted. 
STATEMENT OF THE POINT RELIED UPON 
BY APPELLANT 
That the Trial Court erred in determining and hold-
ing that the complaint did not state a claim upon which 
relief could be gran ted ; 
That the Trial Court erred in granting the respond-
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That the Trial Court erred in making and entering 
its judgment dismissing ::-~aiel complaint. 
The above points involve but one legal princi}Jle, 
and ean and should be argued together. 
ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff contends her complaint Rtatcs a cause 
of action against the defendants, under the provil--3ions 
of Section 14-2-1 and Section 14-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. 'rhc de· 
fendants contend to the contrary. 
The material portions of the above statutory provi-
sions are: 
14-2-1. The owner of any interest in land enter-
ing into a contract, involving $500 or more, for lhe 
construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of 
any building, structure or improvement upon land 
shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain 
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the 
contract price, with good and sufficient sureties, 
conditioned for the faithful performance of the 
contract and prompt payment for material fur-
nished and labor performed under the contract. 
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other 
persons as theiT interest may appear; and any 
person ·who has furnished materials or performed 
labor for or upon any such building, structure or 
improvement, payment for which haR not been 
made, shall have a direct right of artion ag-ainst tlw 
sureties upon snC'h hond for tlw reasonable va1nr 
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of the materials furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon; 
14-~-2. Any person subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good 
and sufficient bond * * * shall be personally liable 
to all persons who have furnished materials or per-
formed labor under the contract for the reasonable 
value of such materials furnished or labor per-
formed, not exceeding, however, in any case the 
prices agreed upon. 
It becomes necessary to construe Sec. 14-2-1 and to 
determine whether a most strict and narrow construction 
shall be given to the terms or improt'ement upon land and 
labor performed under the contract, or whether a liberal 
construction shall be given to these provisions of the 
statute to effectuate the obvious intent of the statute. 
The complaint alleges that the defendants entered 
into a contract with one Bushy, a contractor, to level a 
number of acres of land for them on their premises and 
that the contract price was a sum far in excess of $500.00; 
that the bond contemplated by Section 14-2-1 was not ex-
acted from the contractor; that the plaintiff furnishect 
and delivered to the contractor certain machinery and 
equipment which was m;C'(l in the lPYelling- of thP defend-
ants' land and making· improvements thereon, the samP 
being furnished on credit believing· that the (lefendants 
had either procured the statutory bond or that they them-
selves would he responsible for the reasonable rental 
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value of the machinery . and equipment; that .. the con-
tractor agreed to pay for the rental of the machinery and 
equipment the reasonable value thereof, to-wit, $850.00, 
. no part of which was .paid excepting $408.00, leaving a 
balance of $442.00; that the contractor defaulted in the 
work which defendants completed, and because of the 
eon tractor's .insolvency plaintiff has no means of collect-
. ing her account except from the defendants. 
The complaint does not go into detail as to how or in 
what manner .o.r to what extent the. levelling of land is 
an improvement; but if the defendants by answer or at 
a pre-trial contend ~that such wurk is not .a permanent 
improvement, then at a trial the plaintiff would ·provide 
;~uch evidence in detail. Also at a trial the plaintiff would 
prove that the heavy and expensiYe power machinery 
'would be considerably· moTe . economical, 'efficient and 
speedy than the old' method. of levelling ground by hand 
or by team and scraper Dr fresuo. Also the plaintiff 
could prove at ·a trial, if it was denied, that the work done 
was a· permanent improvement, ·that farming lanas could 
·not be efficiently irrigated l1nless lands were lev-
elled and that such permanent improvement was econom-
ical, necessary 1and valuable,· effecting a Yery consider-
able ·saving in the ·use of ''Tater. 
·we believe the· Court can take. judiCial notice that 
the -levelling' of land is, a· permanent improvement, and 
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that snell work is commonly and generally done by power 
machinery and what is commonly known as "land 
planes'' powered by tractors. Unlike plowing of land, 
planting of crops, etc., which likely could be classified as 
annual work and not an improvement in the sense con-
templated by the statute, the levelling of land is as per-
manent an improvement upon land as would be the con· 
struction of a reservoir or the excavation necessary for 
a cellar or basement under a home. 
\Ye cannot believe that the word ''improvement'' 
upon land following the words ''building, structure'' was 
ever intended to be limited to a building or structure or 
something of that nature built upon the ground. It will 
no doubt be contended by the defendants that the Ian-
gauge ''construction'' of an improvement should be 
given a strict interpretation as being limited to erecting 
soD..te building or placing something on the ground by 
and with new materials. \\' e contend that when earth is 
moved, high spots in land removed, low spots filled in, 
and the contour of the ground made level for good irri·· 
gation that the work done is the consfr11diou of 011 im-
pror(')ll cnt on land. 
The TTtah Supreme Court has had oeen~wn to con 
strue and rule upon the statute in question in two eases, 
to-wit: Rio nro11rlr n;. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 241, 
and Libf'rfy rnol and TJI!Hil)('f ro. 1'8. 8now, fii3 Utah 208, 
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178 Pac. 341. 
In the Rio Grande rs. Darke case the primary ques-
tion was whether the statute was constitutional. !low-
ever, Justice Thurman, in a well considered opinion, 
made the follo"Ting observation (page 246 of 167 Pac.): 
''The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien 
law manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, 
those who perform the labor and furnish the ma-
tena!s which enter into the construction of a build-
ing or other improvement.'' 
In the Liberty Coal rs. Snow case the factual situa-
tion is different, but the court made the following g-en-
eral observations concerning the statute in question: 
''A mere cursory reading of Section 1 of said 
chapter shows that its terms are very broad and 
sweeping. * * * The purpose of the statute is to 
prevent the o·wners of land from having their lands 
improved vvith the materials and labor furnished 
by third persons, and thus to enhance the value of 
such lands, without becoming personally respon-
sible for the reasonable value of the materials and 
labor which enhances the value of those lands. The 
owner may, however, eseape personal liability by 
obtaining the bond required h~T the statute * * *" 
This Court in the case of Jfellen vs. Yondor-Horst 
Bros., et al., 44 Utah 300, 140 Pac. 130, in construing 
Section 1400x Compiled LawR of Utah, 1907, which was 
the forerunner of 14-1-1 U.C.A. 1953, Rtatf'd: 
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"The statute we have quoted is, in and of it-
self, highly remedial, and must thus, in furtherance 
of justice, receive a liberal construction and appli-
cation so as to accon1plish its real purpose and ob-
ject." 
In principle the same rule of construction should be 
applied to Section 14-2-1; the only difference being that 
Sec. 14-1-1 deals with contracts pertaining to public 
work, buildings, etc., and Section 14-2-1 deals 'vith pri-
vate contracts-each section providing for a bond to pro-
tect those furnishing labor and/or materials, and each 
~ection followed by another section creating a direct lia-
bility for failure to procure such bond. (See Sertions 14-
1-3 and 14-2-2 U. C.A. 1953). 
l\fost certainly an individual under the private con-
tract statutes is not and should not be in a rnore enviable 
"md favorable position than a county, municipal corpora-
tion, board of education or state institution, board or 
association under the pn hlic contract statutes. 
There can be no question that Section 14-2-1 1~ a 
highly remedial ;;;tatnte, ancl should receive a liberal con-
struction and applieation so as to accomplish its }'(>a! pur-
pose and objection. ~Toreover, such a ~tatut<~ shonlfl be 
governed by the same principles of liberal construc-
iion as the mechanic's lien Jaw since it is designed to 
protect persons furnishing- labor and/or mah~rial~ for 
1he benefit of a lancl owner. Tn TTfoli-Parifir DirJI':·d, VoL 
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26, Sec. 3, will be found nun1erous cases from all \Vest-
ern jurisdictions holding ''the lien of mechanics, artisans 
and materialmen, is favored inlaw, because those parties 
have, in part, created the very property on which the 
lien attaches'' and ''lien statutes being remedial in their 
nature, should be liberally construed'' and ''lien statutes, 
being equitable in purpose and remedial in nature, are 
to receive a liberal construction." 
This Court has expressed itself on the question in 
the case of Elwell vs. Morrow, 28 Utah 278; 78 Pac. 605, 
in which it is said: 
''The weight of authority is to the effect that 
the well estabHshed rule that remedial provisions of 
statutes are to be liberally construed applies to and 
should be follo·wed in proceedings to foreclose me-
chanics' liens. '' 
It was contended before the trial court that the plain-
tiff having furnished machinery and equipment to the 
contractor is not protected by and does not come within 
the purview of Sec. 14-2-1 because the bond which is re-
quired thereb~r shall be conditioned for the faithful per-
formnace of the contract and prompt payment for mater-
ial furnished and labor performed thereunder; and that 
the furnishing of machinery and equipment on a rental 
basis is neither furnishing material or performing labor. 
We assume that a land owner who has completely 
ignored the provisions of Rection 14-2-1 and failed to 
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protect himself by taking a bon.d from t4e\ (.~<>A tractor, 
cannot claim .to be in a ;more favora.ble. posit~on. than the 
surety who executes,the bond for .. th~ b.en~fit of,the con-
.tractor .. What .is .the)iabihty of the surety w4P. .executes 
a bond '.' condition~d for; the .faithfl~l pe,rf.ormaij_ce of the 
contract and p;rpmpt. ,payment .for :waterial fq.rnished 
.and .labor perfonned under· tha cont;ract,'' as required by 
.the .statute?. Is not the liability ,of the ,lan,d own~r equal 
to that.. of the surety, o:r m,ay theJGtn.d 1owner l~ap an acl-
Yantage. by failing to p1:ocl1re.: the bond 1 
. , We .thin)\: the answ,er is, to :be· found .in. the, case of 
J. F. 1~oltoJt lnr. Co. 1JS. Jlaryland Casualty Co., .77 Utah 
2.26,. · 293 Pac:. 611.. This case was depided in 1930, and 
.has never. been, oYerruled or modifie,d, jn whol~ or in 
part. : On: the. contrary it is c~teq .wit4 ~pproval in the 
case ·of McCormick Baeltz('r f1o. t·s. Haidlen, 6 Pac. :2wl 
. 255 (Cal}, and :the saii,le. rule followed. .in .Shoshone Lurn-
ber Co. vs. Pirl('lity &; DerJost;t eu. of 1lla·;~1Jfrnul, :24 Pac. 
~nd 690 .(Wyo.). 
Ref erring'Jo.' the 7' olt rm. rs. ill aryl 011 rl (! o s If o lty easr, 
Bnpra, a· ,bond was givel). pursuant to tl)e provisions of 
Sec. 14-1-1 on a tpa:d building project. The contractor 
Rnbcontracted · a portion of the. joh aml th<> defendant 
·'\fa ryland Casnalt:T Co.-, af-1 surety, ('XPcntecl a bond con-
ditioned that the subcontract(ln ''shall well and truly pay 
all an<l.every pP;r~on ·fnrn.iRhin·~· m:ltc•r,ial or, .rctrforming 
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labor in and about the construction of said roadway all 
and every sum or sums of money due him, them or any 
of them for all such labor and materials for which the 
subcontractor is liable.'' The statute requires a bond 
conditioned ''that the contractor wiH promptly make 
payment to all persons supplying labor or materials used 
in the prosecution of the work." \Ve see no difference 
between the statutory language and that used in the bond 
in question, so far as the conditions are concerned. 
A claim was made by the plaintiff and its assignors, 
that the surety was liable under the terms of the bond 
for small parts and accessories for automobiles and 
trucks used in the work, for gasoline, oil and grease for 
~se in machinery used on the job, for hauling coal, oil 
and grease from railroad to highway construction, and 
for rental for engine used by highway subcontracto·r in 
constructing the highway, as well as for groceries and 
supplies furnished for boarding house conducted by the 
sn hcontractor. 
The claim was resisted on the ground that these 
items did not constitute either labor or materials used in 
the prosecution of the work. In sustaining the plain-
tiff's right to look to the surety for payment of these 
items, this court went far beyond the liability claimed 
in the case at bar against the land owner. However, since 
one of the claims involn~d was for the rental of an ~n-
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gine, we deem it appropriate to quote from the Court's 
opinion on that point: 
"The last i tern in dispute is the plaintiff's 
claim amounting to $7 4.23, the balance due for 
rental of an engine used on the job. As in the case 
of most of the other items in dispute, there i~ a 
conflict in the decisions as to whether a charge of 
this kind is within the contractor's bond. There 
are many cases upon the subject which are collect-
ed in an annotation found in 44 A.L.R. 381. vVith-
out further reference to the cases it may be said 
that under the liberal statute of interpretation to 
which we are committed, we conclude that the 
charge in question is within the obligation of the 
bond and that the ~nrPty was properl:· held liable 
therefor." 
This court also stated: 
''As a general proposition, bonds of this kind 
do not secure payment for permanent equipment 
furnished the contractor * oj(, * The purpose and in-
tent of the bond is to ~l'cnre payment for thoKe 
things which g·o into the work or contribute to itR 
completion. '' 
The (\nut in tl!C' 'rolton cas<' l'C'Yi<'WC'<l the brg·c· 
nnmher of cas0s f'i 1<·<1 by both the appellant and tlw 1'\'-
}Jonclent, and it wonld s<'n'P no nsefnl pnrposC' to qnoh! 
at length from that opinion since no donht the en.-;<• i1~elf 
wil1 he rearl, analyzed and (ligeste(l h:r this C:onrt. Rnf-
fice it to say that this C:onrt has nnnonncNl what it he-
liP\·es to he the wPig·ht of nutlwrit~T ancl is committed to 
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the liberal doctrine. 
In the later California case, lJJcCormick 8aeltzer 
Co. vs. Haidlen, 6 Pac. 2nd 256, the same question was 
before the court, and the court said : 
''The rule seems to be now well established 
that bonds furnished under the Public Works Act 
of this State are to be liberally construed to effect 
the manifest purpose of the statute; the theory be-
ing that the statute here under consideration was 
intended to cover all those things which contribut-
ed to the improvement, whether directly or physic-
ally going into the construction, or indirectly by be-
ing entirely used or consumed in the construction. 
(Citing numerous cases), In a number of these 
cases it was held that rental of machinery, money 
expended on the hiring of teams, money spent for 
provisions, equipment, etc., are all recoverable 
against the surety.'' 
National Surety vs. Bratnober Lurnber Co., 122 Pac. 
337 (Wash), involves a claim for furnishing horses on a 
job. 
IJ;Jultnomah County vs. United States F & G Co., 180 
Pac. 104 (Ore.), involves a claim for horses rented and 
held that services of horses constituted "labor" within 
the meaning of the bond. 
We believe the Oregon Supreme Court in the case 
of Multnomah Co1tnty vs. U. 8. F & G Co., 170 Pac. 525, 
at page 527, has stated the situation with g-reater clarity 
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anu emphasis than could the plaintiff, and we quote: 
''According to the strict legal definition of the 
term ''labor and material'' the use of the engine 
would not be embraced therein. There can be no 
question but that the service of the machine in the 
actual grading of the highway, as alleged in the 
complaint, is covered by the language of the con-
tract and bond * * * Statutes like the one in ques-
tion haYe usually been and should be given a lib-
eral construction so as to carry out the legislative 
intent and effect the purpose contemplated by the 
law. * * * In the case at bar if the work mentioned 
had been performed by the exercise of the muscles 
of laborers, there would have been no question but 
that the same was protected lJ~t the statute. \Vith 
the hard surface road paYement coming into \'O,:.!.'lW, 
new methods of road construction utilizing high 
power machiner:·, equipment and appliances haYl' 
superseded the old mode of construction \\"ith pick 
and shovel. It seems to us that it was intended bv 
the enactment, as expressed by the lawmakers, thdt 
the construction of an improvement, such as a 
paYec1 higlnYa~-, should he pai<1 for; that in order 
to carry ont the intc,nt of the law it was the right 
and duty of the county officials to require a bond 
protecting; the pa:vment of ohli~·ations incnrrt>d for 
labor or material approximatilt,Q,' the constrnction 
work. Plainly the bond ancl contrae1 in qnestion 
made such provisions and nomiwl1<'<1 the item siw<1 
for. The lnngnage of the stahtt<' indie;1tes that thC> 
lmvwak<'rs had in minc1 tlw modc>rn rolH1i tions prc>·· 
vailin~: at the time of the rnactmc>nt. ( ,\ncl on page 
526 of 170 Pac. in this case, it is said: rrhe act and 
the bond are susceptible of a more liberal construc-
tion than tlw lien statutes). 
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In Fuller vs. Brooks, :246 Pac. 369 (Old), the ~arne 
question was before the court and it was urged that the 
defendants were only liable under the statutory bond tor 
the value of such material as was used in the improve-
ment and cited several cases to support this contention. 
The court said: 
''Several of the cases involve the enforcement 
of mechanic's lien between materialmen and the 
owners of the improvements. The defendants de-
sire to make the rule applicable to the enforcement 
of the mechanic's lien, as the guide in construing 
the bonds given pursuant to Section 7 486, supra. 
The liability upon a bond given pursuant to Sec-
tion 7 486 is not always measured by the rule applic-
able to the enforcement of the mechanic's lien be-
tween the owner of the improvements and the ma-
terialmen. There is a distinction to some extent 
between the principles applying in the respective 
cases. * * * The rule for determining the defend-
ant's liability for the value of the material in-
volves in this case is whether the particular mater-
ials were consumed in the course of the construction 
of the improvements. \V e cannot see any differ-
ence between the nature of human force and me-
chanical force expended in the constrnction of a 
public improvPment. Certainly the defendants are 
liable for the l-,hysical efforts of the laborers. We 
cannot see any distinction between individual force 
consumed and expended and that of mechanical 
force and power 0xpended and consumed in doing 
the same work. In fact, common experience has 
proven that much of the labor formerly done by 
persons can be accompliRhed b~r mechanical nw:m~ 
for less expense.'' 
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vVe concede that most of the cases cited, particularly 
ihose having to do with the question of whether rentals 
for machinery shall be considered as ''furnishing mater-
ial or performing labor,'' are cases in which bonds were 
given under the public contracts statute and not under 
the pri~·ate contracts statute. It will be noted that our 
public contracts statute (Sec. 14-1-1) is designated as 
''Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.'' Our 
private contracts statute (Sec. 14-2-1) has the identical 
designation. There can be no question but what the ob-
ject and purpose of each statute is the same and the con-
ditions of the bond required is the same, to-wit: ''for 
the faithful performance of the contract and for the 
prompt payment for material furnished and labor per-
formed under the contract. The language of the two 
~tatutes differ slightly in the manner of expression, uut 
the difference is in words only, not intent or substance. 
The one substantial difference is that under 1 hP ptl blic 
contracts statute, a bond is requin·<l in·psrweti\'C of 
amount since no lien can attach to public works, and mt-
der the private contrads statnt<· the bond is reqt•ircd 
when the amount is in c·xeess of $500.00. \VP submit, 
therefore, that the principles gov<·rning the construction 
and interpretation of the pn blic works sta tnte arc con-
trolling in tlw construction and interprc>tation of thc> pri-
vate contracts statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff's com-
plaint does state facts sufficient to entitle her to the re-
lief sought, that is, the unpaid rental value of the ma-
chinery furnished and we submit that the judgment 
should be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. '' 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, WILSON & CLINE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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